I’ve used a simple five-finger model for many years when looking at businesses and investment opportunities. Hold up five fingers and, broadly speaking, I’d expect one business to thrive, two to survive and two to nosedive. It’s not a scientific calculation, but it’s a useful way of thinking about the risks involved, particularly when looking at a collection of investment opportunities.

What I’ve found interesting over the years is that the survive businesses often end up drifting towards nosedive rather than moving into thrive. They may have a decent product, some customers and a reasonable business plan, but something isn’t quite working. They keep trading, perhaps raise more money, and continue to believe the next big contract or funding round will change everything. Sometimes it does, but often the underlying problems are still there.

The real question is whether those businesses could have been made stronger before the money went in.

The funder’s problem

Funders are looking for the businesses that will thrive, but recognising them isn’t always straightforward. A good presentation, an enthusiastic founder and an attractive financial forecast can make almost any opportunity look promising. The difficulty is establishing whether the business can actually deliver what it’s proposing.

There is plenty of evidence that investment returns are unevenly distributed. In venture capital particularly, a relatively small number of successful investments can generate much of the return across a portfolio. That doesn’t mean every funder expects two out of five investments to fail, but it does explain why identifying the stronger opportunities matters so much.

Due diligence is supposed to help, although there’s a practical limit to how deeply a funder can examine every opportunity. Larger transactions can involve teams of lawyers, accountants, technical specialists and commercial advisers, all of whom cost money. The longer the process runs, the more expensive it becomes, and if the deal doesn’t complete, somebody still has to pick up the bill.

Smaller transactions have their own difficulties. A funder might be looking at businesses operating in energy, technology, manufacturing, healthcare and a dozen other markets. It’s unrealistic to expect them to have specialist knowledge of every sector, particularly when understanding the opportunity requires experience of the customers, competitors, pricing and practical challenges of operating in that market.

They can examine the accounts, challenge the forecasts and review the contracts, but that doesn’t necessarily tell them whether customers will buy the product at the proposed price or whether the business has the capability to deliver it profitably.

That’s where some of the problems begin.

A good idea doesn’t necessarily make a good business

I’ve come across plenty of businesses with excellent products and genuinely interesting opportunities that simply haven’t developed the commercial structure around them.

A founder may know the technology inside out but have limited experience of building a sales operation. The financial model might show impressive growth without a properly developed sales pipeline to support it. The business may have an accountant producing the numbers, but nobody performing the wider financial management role you’d expect from a CFO, connecting commercial activity, cash flow, working capital and future funding requirements.

Then there are the market assumptions. Who exactly is the customer? How large is the market the business can realistically reach? Who else is competing for that customer, and what are they charging? How much will customers actually pay, and how long will it take to persuade them to buy?

These aren’t particularly complicated questions, but getting reliable answers can be surprisingly difficult. A business might be addressing a market worth billions, yet have no convincing explanation of how it’s going to capture even a small part of it.

The same applies to management. A founder can be brilliant at developing a product and still be the wrong person to manage every aspect of a growing business. Without the right people around them, decisions become bottlenecks, financial control weakens and opportunities get missed.

None of this automatically makes the business a nosedive. But it can leave it firmly in survive territory, regardless of how attractive the investor presentation looks.

The danger of simply surviving

A survive business can be particularly difficult to recognise because it may appear to be making reasonable progress. Revenue is growing, customers are coming on board and the next financial year looks better than the last. The problem is that growth isn’t necessarily translating into cash, profitability or a business that can support itself.

Additional investment can keep things moving, but it can also disguise weaknesses that haven’t been addressed. The business raises another round, takes on more commitments and increases its cost base, all on the assumption that the expected growth will arrive.

When it doesn’t, the options become more limited. The next funding round is harder, existing investors become more cautious and management spends increasing amounts of time trying to keep the business financed rather than developing it.

That’s how a survive business can gradually become a nosedive.

It’s also why I think founders should spend more time challenging their business model before approaching funders, rather than assuming investment will solve the problems.

Moving from survive to thrive

The encouraging part is that some survive businesses have the potential to become thrive businesses without changing everything they’re doing.

Sometimes the sales strategy needs attention. The business may be pursuing too many markets, spreading its resources too thinly or relying on a small number of relationships rather than building a repeatable commercial process. Concentrating on the customers most likely to buy, and understanding what they’re prepared to pay, can make a considerable difference.

In other cases, the management structure needs strengthening. Bringing in experienced financial leadership, clarifying responsibilities or introducing better reporting can expose problems early enough to do something about them. A proper financial model should help management make decisions, not simply provide attractive numbers for a funding presentation.

Funding structure can make a difference too. Equity isn’t always the answer to every requirement. Equipment, working capital, development expenditure and international expansion may be better supported through different forms of finance, with investment introduced at the stages where it can create the most value.

And sometimes the business needs somebody from outside to challenge assumptions that have become accepted internally. Founders naturally become attached to their ideas, and management teams can spend so much time dealing with day-to-day pressures that they lose sight of the wider commercial picture.

The important thing is recognising what needs to change and being prepared to change it.